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MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 
Vo:r.. XVI. JANUARY, 1918 
THE LAW OF BLASPHEMY 
No. 3. 
I S CHRISTIANITY part of the Law of England? It would seem that if it ever was so, it is so no longer. Such at least is 
the conclusion which Austin's "simple-minded layman" will 
undoubtedly draw from the recent decision of the House of Lords 
in Bowman v. The Secular Society, Limited, [1917] A. C. 4o6. The 
lawyer who recognizes that such phrases as the above can have lit· 
tle or no value in legal science will be more concerned to note the 
unanimous determination of the final court of appeal in Great 
Britain in favor of the view of the law of blasphemy expressed 
by Lord COLERIDGE, L. C. J., in Reg. v. Ramsay and Foote, 15 Cox 
C. C. 231, against the contrary doctrine of the late Sir James Fitz-
james STEPHEN, and the overruling by general consent (Lord FIN-
r,AY, L. C., alone dissentin.1?) of the well-known case of Cowan v. 
Milbourn, L. R. 2 Ex. 230. In the British constitution a judgment of 
the House of Lords has the same finality as an Act of Parliament, 
and so we may take it as settled for all time (in the absence of 
intervention of Parliament) that in English law "the crime of blas-
phemy is not constituted by a temperate attack on religion in which 
the decencies of controversy are maintained". (Lord FINLAY, L. C., 
at p. 423.) 
What it is constituted by is perhaps, notwithstanding the pro-
nouncements of five learned Lords of Appeal, not free from doubt. 
It seems that in England as in Scotland "scurrility or indecency 
is an essential element of the crime of blasphemy at common law", 
(Lord FINLAY, ubi sup.); that "to constitute blasphemy at common 
law there must be such as element of vilification, ridicule or irrever-
ence as would be likely to exasperate the feelings of others and so 
lead to a breach of the peace", (Lord PARKER, p. 446); that words 
may be blasphemous "for their manner, their violence, or ribaldry, 
or, more fully !tated, for their tendency to endanger the peace then 
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and there, to deprave public morality generally, to shake the fabric 
of society, and to be the cause of civil strife" (Lord SuMN~R, at 
p. 466); that the offence is associated with, and perhaps consti-
tuted by, "violent, offensive, or indecent words" ; and "the common 
law of England does not render criminal the mere propagation of 
doctrines hostile to the Christian faith. The crime consists in the 
manner in which the doctrines are advocated, and whether in each 
case this is a crime is a question for the jury, who should be directed 
in the words of ERSKINE, J., in Shore v. Wilson1 quoted by the Mas-
ter of the Rolls in his judgment on the present case", (Lord BucK-
MAS'l'ER, at p. 470) ; that ·'blasphemy is constituted by violent and 
gross language, and the phrase 'reviling the Christian religion' shows 
that without vilification there is no offence." (at p. 475).2 
To extract a definition of blasphemy from such a wealth of dicta 
might be no easy work. But we must remember that in jure onmis 
dcfinitio periculosa est and be thankful that if we do not know what 
blasphemy is, at all events we know what it is not. So far, at least, 
the judgment of the House of Lords is conclusive. 
Before the House gave its decision there was room for doubt, 
for uncertainty. The views of Lord CoLERIDGE and of Sir James 
STEPHEN had their respective partizans. Today the uncertainty is 
removed. We know what the law is, so far as this consists in 
knowing what it is not, and with the same qualification, we know 
what the law always has been; for the business of judges, however 
eminent, of courts of justice, however august, is not to make law, 
but to ascertain it. We must take it, then, that the Bench, presided 
over by Lord RAYMOND, who in Rex v. Woolston, I Barn. K. B. 162, 
refused to listen to an argument tending to show that Christianity 
might be lawfully called in question, were wrong in their law, and 
that they and the numerous later judges, who following HALE, 
C. J.,3 have declared that "Christianity is parcel of the laws of 
s "It ia "indeed still blasphemy, punishable at common law, scoffingly or irreverently 
to ridicule or impugn the doctrines of the Christian faith, and no one would be allowed 
to give or to claim any pecuniary encouragement for such purpose; yet any man may, 
without subjecting himself to any penal consequences, soberly and reverently examine 
and question the truth of those doctrines which have been assumed as essential to it. 
And I am not aware of any impediment to the application of any charitable fund for the 
encouragement of such inquiries." 9 CL. & F. at p. 524, cited by Lord Cozens-Hardy, 
M. R. [1915], :z Ch. at p. 463. 
~The learned judge refers to Harrison v. Evans, :z Burn's Ecc. Law at p. 218, in 
which Lord Mansfield said:-''The common law of England * • • knows of no prosecu-
tion for mere opinions. For atheism, blasphemy, and reviling the Christian religion, 
ihero have been instances .of persons prosecuted and punished upon the common law 
... ". . 
1 Taylor's Case, I Vent. 293. 
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England", did not know what they meant, as, indeed, they very 
likely did not. 
It is possible that their Lordships are right in their history as, 
beyond private liberty of question, they are right in their law. 
Certainly there are indications-<The Queen v. Read (Fortesc. 98) is 
a surprising example-of a disinclination on the part of the com-
mon law courts to burden themselves with matters which even so 
late as the eighteenth century were considered to fall within the 
competence of the ecclesiastical courts. On the other hand, the 
prevailing sentiment of today towards religion is very different 
from what it was two or two and a half centuries ago, and it can-
not be denied, whatever legal theory may say to the contrary, that 
the decisions of courts of justice take their color from the tendency 
of the age. There will be many, therefore, who--the authoritative 
pronouncement of the House of Lords notwithstanding-will still 
be inclined to agree with the late Mr. Justice STSPHSN, that "to 
say that the crime [of blasphemy] lies in the manner and not in 
the matter appears to me to be an attempt to evade and explain 
away a law which has no doubt-ceased to be in harmony with the 
temper of the times".' However this may be, the House of Lords 
has decided, and that for an English lawyer is the end of the 
matter. The decision makes law. Therefore it would be imperti-
nent to call it in question. But it is permitted to examine the pro-
cesses of reasoning by which their Lordships arrived at their con-
clusion, and to this the remainder of this paper will be directed. 
Like any other court administering the common law, the House 
of Lords goes for its law to the cases. Accordi,ng to the now estab-
lished rule it is bound by its own decisions, but not by the decisions 
of any inferior tribunal. Nevertheless the pronouncements of in-
ferior courts if not authoritative are at least persuasive. They 
are entitled to be weighed in the balance of the judicial mind. The 
presumption is that they were rendered in accordance with justice 
and that they applied the right rule of law to the facts. Strictly 
speaking, no decision goes beyond the established or assumed facts 
of the particular case.6 So far the facts limit the rule. But just 
as the laws of nature are collected from a multitude of single in-
stances, so the rules of law are supposed to be generalised from 
previous decisions. Both are generalisations from particulars but 
not to the same degree. The great difference is that whereas the 
laws of nature are implicit in the facts of nature so that all the 
grouped facts illustrate and express the law, in the case of the laws 
• Stephen Hist. Criminal Law, vol. a, p. 475. 
1 Per Halsbury L. C. in Quinn v. Lealhem [15101] A. C. at p. 506. 
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of man this is not so. There the uniformity which ultimately pre-
vails as a rule of law is generalised not from all the grouped facts, 
that is, from all the decisions relating to the same subject-matter, 
but only from some of them. The others do not affirm the rule. 
They contradict it. This must always be the case when the decisions 
speak with uncertain or conflicting voices. The matter which comes 
up for decision today, let us suppose, is not covered by authority. 
There is no case on all fours with it. The ground is not already 
occupied. The Court, then, must hunt about in the neighborhood, 
as it were, for analogies. A rule must be looked for and found (for 
found it must be) in other cases which have something in com-
mon, but perhaps not the one thing essential in common, with the 
case under consideration. Very likely the doubt which arises in 
the later case never presented itself to the judges who passed upon 
the earlier cases. Perhaps they tacitly assumed as true what is 
now called in question and if they refrained from affirming it did 
so not because the proposition was doubted, still less denied, but 
simply because it never occurred to them or to any one else to doubt 
or deny it. This is especially likely to be the case at times when the 
judicial mind is satisfied with a vague generality such as that which 
asserts that Christianity is parcel of the laws of England. It is not 
in such an atmosphere that the definition of blasphemy will receive 
close analysis, or an exact line be drawn between the matter and 
the manner of a blasphemous libel. So it may happen that for a 
century or more the law remains uncertain because not thought out. 
Cases accumulate, but the law is not elucidated. When at last a 
straight issue arises which can be no longer ignored or evaded the 
Court is under the necessity of deciding, and of deciding not upon 
caprice, but by some supposed rule of law. The rule must be 
looked for in the decisions, but it is not there. Instead of a clear 
statement of principle we find only obscure suggestions of con-
flicting principles-some rhetoric, many dicta, little law, no guidance. 
In such circumstances to say that the rule is found in the cases is 
contrary to fact. Found in or suggested by some of the cases it 
may be, but found in the cases in the sense that the laws of nature 
are found in the phenomena of nature, it is not. So far from the 
rule being derived from the decisions, the decisions are tested by 
the rule. It is not a case of inductive reasoning, but of deduction, 
the rule itself being antecedently determined on grounds of rea-
son, convenience, public policy or individual prejudice. · 
The above contention is, of course, contrary to orthodox doc-
trine, but it is in accordance with what actually .takes place. The 
decision of the House of Lords in Bowman v. The Secular Society, 
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Limited, is a case in point. Their Lordships as an ultimate court 
of appeal, untrammeled by previous decisions of their own House 
were, in law, free to decide as they pleased. The cases, far from 
being an aid, were something of an embarrassment. An extract 
from Lord DuNEDIN's judgment shows that he would have been 
more at ease without them. 
"My Lords, I have said that I have formed my opinion not with-
out hesitation; but that hesitation is due to one fact only. Had there 
been no authorities to deal with, and I were to approach the matter 
from the point of view of legal principle alone, I do not think I 
should have felt much difficulty. What has troubled me is that I 
think it is impossible to decide the case as I think it should be de-
cided without going counter to what has been said by judges of 
great authority in past generations. It is always, I feel, no light 
matter to overrule such pronouncements. "6 
Clearly his Lordship has some way of arriving at the law which 
does not consist in the examination of cases. Why need he examine 
them since they do not bind him? He knows how the case "should 
be decided" and regrets that it cannot be decided as it should be 
without running counter to what has been said by eminent judges 
of bygone days. Lord DUNEDIN finds all that is necessary to a 
just decision in a recourse to "legal principle". What this means 
is not quite apparent. A legal principle not enshrined in any de-
cision relating to the law of blasphemy and yet, when applied, fit 
to determine what that law is, scarcely admits of precise state-
ment. When the learned judge speaks of approaching the matter 
from the point of view of legal principle, does he mean more than 
this-that his own sense of right and fitness, the reaction of his 
mind to the moral environment, would, in his judgment lead to a 
right conclusion? If this is so, the point is reached at which law 
loses its identity in the larger precepts of morality. The learned 
judge seems to tum his back upon the cases, which point nowhere 
or in an undesired direction, to follow the plainer admonitions of 
"private justice, moral fitness and public convenience"1 as he sees 
them. 
The other Lords do the same, though perhaps less consciously. 
The Lord Chancellor, Lord FINLAY-passes in review the main 
cases on the subject of blasphemy prior to Reg. v. Ramsa~ and 
• [1917] A. C. at p. 432, 
'"It could be done only on principles of private justice, moral fitness, and public 
convenience; which, when applied to a new subject, make common law without a 
precedent; much more, when received and approved by usage." Per Willes J. in Millar 
v. Taylor, 4 Burr. at p. 2312. 
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Foote,8 viz., Rex v. Taylor,9 Rex v. Woolston,10 Re.xv. Williams,11• 
("in connection with which Rex v. Mary Carlile12 and Rex v. 
Eaton18 should be referred to"), Rex v. W addington,14 Reg. v. 
H etherington!5 · In all the cases, he finds that the language used 
w~s scurrilous and offensive, though this is less apparent in ·the 
reports of Rex v. Woolston than in the others." But examination of 
the libels in respect of which informations in that case were filed 
* * * shows that the sacred subjects treated by him were handled 
with a great deal of irreverence, and in many passages language 
was used by him that was blasphemous in every sense of the term."10 
The Lord Chancellor concludes: "The true view of the law of 
blasphemy appears to me to be that expressed by Lord DENMAN 
in Rex v. Hetherington, which is substantially in accordance with 
that taken by Lord COLERIDGE i1i Reg. v. Ramsay and Foote and fol-
lowed by PHILLIMORE, J., in Rex v. Boulter."11 
It is unnecessary to review the judgments of the other members 
of the Court, though each of them contains much that is of interest 
and value. More cogently, perhaps, in them than in the Lord Chan-
cellor's judgment, the in!pression, forces itself on the reader that 
the court progresses from the rule to the cases, and not from the 
cases to the rule. Lord DUNEDIN, we have seen, has recourse to 
"legal principle.'' Lords PARKER and BUCKMASTER rely also upon 
the argument ab inconvenienti. All agree with Lord FINLAY that it 
is not and never has been part of the law of England that a temper-
ate and respectful attack on the fundamental doctrines of Chris-
tianity eiposes the person who makes it to criminal proceedings. 
Has it really never been so? Is it believed that such was the view 
of Lord HOLT, who tried Taylor in 1675, of Lord RAYMOND who 
tried Woolston in 1729, of Lord :K:ENYON, whose zeal for religion 
converted Julian the Apostate into an apologist for Christianity at 
the trial of Williams in 1797.18 of Lord ELLENBOROUGH, who sen-
tenced Eaton in 1812? Would any one of these learned judges--
all Chief Justices of England-have condoned as falling outside 
the limits of legal blasphemy the lecture which Cowan proposed 
• 15 Cox C. C. 231. 
• 1 Vent. 293. 
1° Fitzg. 64; 2 Str. 834; 1 :Barn. K. :S. 162. 
1126 St. Tr. 653 . 
.. 3 :s. & Al. 167. 
12 31 St. Tr. 927. 
1' 1 :B. & C, 26, 
11 5 Jur. 529; 4 St. Tr. (N. S.) 563 • 
.. [1917) A. c. 422, 423. 
17 72 J. P. 188. . 
12 26 St. Tr. 704, "Julian, Justin Martyr and Other Apologists•* * "· 
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to deliver in Milboum's hall? To maintain the affirmative is to 
do violence to the historical sense. · 
The second principal argument for the appellants in Bowman v. 
The Seettlar Society, Limited, was directed to the point that a court 
-0f law would not assist in the promotion of such objects as that for 
which the Secular Society was formed whether they were criminal 
or not. On this point the Lord Chancellor differed from his col-
leagues taking the view that the law was correctly stated in Briggs 
v. Hartley and in Cowan v. Milbourn. His judgment contains 
a grave protest against a court of law waiting upon the spirit of 
the age. 
"But we have to deal not with a rule of public policy which might 
fluctuate with the opinions of the age, but with a definite rule of 
law to the effect that any purpose hostile to Christianity is illegal. 
The opinion of the age may influence the application of this rule, 
but cannot affect the rule itself. It can never be the duty of a 
Court of law to begin by inquiring what is the spirit of the age and 
in supposed conformity with it to decide what the law is."111 
This argument failed to carry conviction with the other memben. 
()f the Court. If the objects for which the Secular Society was in-
<:orporated were not illegal-and on that point the Lords were 
unanimous-what was to prevent it from claiming a legacy under 
Mr. Bowman's will? Lord DUNEDIN deals with this point as fol-
lows:-
"Criminal liability being negatived, no one has suggested any 
.statute in terms of which it-by which I mean the supposed use 
of the money-is directly prohibited. There is no question of 
offence against what may be termed the natural moral sense. Neither 
'has it been held, I think, as being against public policy, as that 
phrase is applied in the cases that have been decided on that head. 
Now if this is so, I confess I cannot bring myself to believe that 
there is still a terra media of things illegal which are not criminal, 
not directly prohibited, not contra bonos mores, and not against 
public policy. Yet that, I think, is the result of holding that any-
thing inconsistent with Christianity as part of the law of England 
<:annot in any way be assisted by the action of the Courts".20 
The House of Lords therefore, Lord FINLAY, L. C., dissenting, 
refused to follow Briggs v. ·Hartley21 and Cowan v. Milbourn,22 
which are accordingly overruled. For the reasons stated above one 
11 [1917] A. C. at p. 432. 
,.At p. 434· 
21 19 L. J. (Ch.) 416. 
n L. R. 2 Ex. 230. 
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may be permitted to speculate whether the milder view of blas-
phemy accepted by Lord FINLAY himself does not conflict with his 
canon forbidding courts of law to wait upon the spirit of the age. 
Having gone so far he might have gone the whole way and con-
curred with the other Lords of Appeal in declaring Briggs v. Hart-
ley and Cowan v. Milbourn to be wrongly decided. 
That the law of blasphemy is today what it always was and al-
ways was what it is today, is, at all events in legal theory, the con-
sequence of Bowman v. The Secielar Society, Limited, but it is a 
consequence from which the members of the court, or some of them, 
seem to shrink. The difficulty is to find a formula which admits 
that the law is changed, while denying that this or that decision has 
changed it. Lord SUMNER, apparently, throws the burden on the 
jury. Just as a libel consists in a writing which "a jury, consisting 
of twelve shopkeepers"28 finds to be defamatory, so sedition con-
sists in what the same twelve men deem to be subversive of society, 
and blasphemy (a species of sedition?) in what the jury considers 
to be subversive of society because subversive of religion. "After 
all, the Question whether a given. opinion is a danger to society is 
a question of the times and is a question of fact".2~ If this is a 
correct statement of the rationale of the law, we are not likely to 
hear much more of prosecutions for blasphemy, for a generation 
which tolerates the excursions into theology of Mr. George Moore 
and of Mr. Wells (to say nothing of Monsieur Anatole France) 
certainly has no very exacting standard as regards the so-called de-
cencies of controversy. Another and perhaps safer formula is pro-
vided by Lord BucKMAS'l'ER, when he says-"If . . . the law is not 
clear, it is certainly in accordance with the best precedents so to 
express it that it may stand in agreement with the judgment of 
reasonable men".25 As a standard for a court of ultimate appeal 
these words seem unexceptionable. But it is noticeable that they 
are inconsistent with the pretence of finding new law in old cases. 
Is our time-honoured method of looking for law in previous de-
cisions nearly played out? And, if so, what is to take its place? In 
civil law jurisdictions the decisions of the courts are said to be 
determined by the authority of reason rather than by reason of 
authority. But this too has its weak side. A system which allows 
a judge of first instance to decline to follow the considered judg-
ment of a court of appeal simply because he disagrees with it, may 
be gravely unfair to one of the litigants, who must either submit to 
~Dicey, Law of the Constitution, Ed. 8, p. 242. 
" [1917] A. C. at p. 467. 
:llAt P• 471. 
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the expense and annoyance of an appeal or acquiesce in a decision 
which nothing will persuade him to be other than capriciously un-
just. In France and Germany, we are told, the modem tendency 
has been in favour of recognising the binding force of decided cases. 
This is still more markedly so in jurisdictions like the Union of 
South Africa and the Province of Quebec-no doubt it is the same 
in the Philippines,-where the civil law comes into close contact 
with common law influences.· Perhaps it would be rash to assume 
that this phenomenon manifests itself in all civil law countries, but 
it would not be surprising if it did. Meanwhile there are some 
indications that in common law jurisdictions the pendulum is swing-
ing in the other direction. Nor can it well be otherwise. We live 
in a world in which everything is in flux. How can law subsist if 
it continues to patter the language of dead ages? Some new way 
must be found-some way (pace Lord FINLAY) of interpreting law 
in accordance with the spirit of the age. 
The great significance of the judgments of the Lords in Bowman 
v. The Secular Society, Limited, is that they have in fact attempted 
to restate the law in harmony with modem conditions. But, and 
this is equally significant, they have done so-if one may respect-
fully say it-with imperfect success. Fettered by a traditional 
method of enquiry they have failed to solve the questions what 
blasphemy is today, and how far and why it falls within the scope 
of the criminal law. Let it be granted that the courts no longer 
punish it as an insult to God. Is there no alternative but the para-
doxical conclusion that it is punished merely as it tends to a breach 
of the peace? Another view would be that blasphemy is essentially 
an affront to a primordial right of a man's personality, a kind of 
moral obscenity, an outrage upon the liberty of thought and belief 
which the modem law allows to every citizen. Thus regarded, 
whether blasphemy is criminally punishable will be largely a matter 
of circumstance. Lapses from good taste and right feeling may be 
overlooked in private conversation, which ought not to be tolerated 
if paraded in public; and public plasphemy again will be more easily 
condoned in an advertised lecture or address, when a shocked 
auditor may be thought to have "come to the nuisance", than on 
a tramcar or in the public street, where decent people are entitled 
to protection from language which is offensive to their feelings. 
This aspect of the case might be ventilated on a fitting occasion. 
To do so now lies outside the scope of the writer's purpose. 
R. W. LES, D.C.L., M.A. 
Dean of the Facitlty of Law, McGill U11iversity; 
Barrister at Law of Gray's Inn, London. 
